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ABSTRACT
The polarization of political opinions among members of the U.S. legislative chambers measured by their voting records is
greater today than it was thirty years ago. Previous research efforts to find causes of such increase have suggested diverse
contributors, like growth of online media, echo chamber effects, media biases, or disinformation propagation. Yet, we lack
theoretic tools to understand, quantify, and predict the emergence of high political polarization among voters and their legislators.
Here, we analyze millions of roll-call votes cast in the U.S. Congress over the past six decades. Our analysis reveals the critical
change of polarization patterns that started at the end of 1980’s. In earlier decades, polarization within each Congress tended
to decrease with time. In contrast, in the recent decades, the polarization has been likely to grow within each term. To shed
light on the reasons for this change, we introduce here a formal model for competitive dynamics to quantify the evolution of
polarization patterns in the legislative branch of the U.S. government. Our model represents dynamics of polarization, enabling
us to successfully predict the direction of polarization changes in 28 out of 30 U.S. Congresses elected in the past six decades.
From the evolution of polarization level as measured by the Rice index, our model extracts a hidden parameter - polarization
utility which determines the convergence point of the polarization evolution. The increase in the polarization utility implied
by the model strongly correlates with two current trends: growing polarization of voters and increasing influence of election
campaign funders. Two largest peaks of the model’s polarization utility correlate with significant political or legislative changes
happening at the same time.
Introduction
Conflict and consensus play important role in the functioning of a social system. In the context of political competition they
manifest themselves as polarization of opinions and collaboration to reach consensus on shared national interests1. Polarization
arises from the politicians’ need to represent opinions of their voters while collaboration is required to balance the interests of
many groups. Numerous previous publications have focused on the role of social conformity2–4 in polarization. Among these
publications, many hypotheses have been proposed to explain the observed emergence of increased polarization, including social
homophily5, selective exposure6, social bots7, echo chambers8, 9, propagation of low-quality information or fake news10, 11, as
well as the effect of viral news12 and social media13. While these models study different aspects of polarization of political
views, they share some common assumptions about human social behavior14, including the following: (i) individuals iteratively
update their views to reach consensus with their neighbors in a social network; (ii) the tolerance of conflicting views is limited
in social context, so frequent active disagreements usually break of social ties15. These assumptions indicate that the loyalty
to one’s group usually leads to the conformity with views of the group’s majority16, and such conformity tightens social ties
within the group. Therefore, in our model, we allow the current polarization level to influence its future growth.
We analyze millions of roll-call votes cast in the U.S. Congress17 over the past six decades to identify evolution of political
polarization patterns. Using the roll-call vote results, we quantify the level of polarization in the legislative branch of government
over the last six decades. We assume a social system dominated by two parties. In such a system polarization and collaboration
can convert into each other but they maintain their sum constant at 1. A simple model of the dynamics of such conversion19 can
be written as
dx
dt
= yPyx(x,ux)− xPxy(x,ux) (1)
where x ∈ [0,1] is the current polarization level, as measured by the real legislative votes, while ux is a parameter independent
of the current polarization level. We call parameter ux the polarization utility in analogy to the role of gravitational utility in
physics. The complementary values denoted as y = 1− x and uy = 1− ux represent the current collaboration level and the
collaboration utility, respectively, while Pyx(x,ux) is the probability of collaboration converting to polarization per unit of
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time. For symmetry, Pxy(x,ux) represents the probability of polarization converting to collaboration per unit of time. Studying
polarization in the U.S. Congress, we assume the evolution is fully governed by the nonlinear dynamics defined in Eq. [5].
However, every two years, the dynamical system moves to a new state determined by the election of members of the next
Congress for which this state then becomes the initial state.
Up to the end of 1980’s, the polarization level within each Congress tended to decrease. Since then, however, the polarization
has been likely to grow within two-year term of each Congress, as shown in Fig. 3A. This phenomenon is represented in
our model by the change of the polarization utility, since it determines the polarization level to which the system converges,
regardless of its initial state. As illustrated in Fig. 3B and 3C, the non-linear dynamics successfully predict the direction of
polarization change in 28 out of 30 U.S. Congresses for the past six decades. The two Congresses that in disagreement with
the model predictions have very small variations of polarization, with a weakly-defined polarization direction, making the
predication error small. Moreover, Fig. 3D suggests that farther away is the initial polarization caused by member replacement
from the corresponding equilibrium defined by our model, faster the polarization level changes during the two-year period
between elections.
In our model, the non-linear gain-loss function quantifies the conversion between collaboration and polarization among
legislators. The model implies that the polarization level always converges to an equilibrium point, while replacement of
members in each Congress caused by election sets the new initial polarization level. We also derive an approximate analytic
expression for the equilibrium points, which are defined by the polarization utility and the system’s sensitivity to the current
polarization. Our model implies that the observed increased polarization in the recent few decades is caused by the growing
polarization utility. This conclusion prompts the question about the causes of this growth. We address this question in the
Discussion section.
Table 1. The statistics of the roll-call votes from the 85th to the 114th U.S. Congress.
Party #Members #Bills #Votes #Votes per member #Votes per year
Democratic Party 1498 31,879 7,368,921 4919.17 122815.35
Republican Party 1395 31,879 6,275,886 4498.84 104598.1
The bills which received less than 30 votes are not included in the above statistics.
Quantifying polarization in the legislative branch
We analyze millions of roll-call votes1 cast in the U.S. Congress17 over the past six decades to identify evolution of political
polarization patterns. The statistics of the roll-call votes in Congresses with sessions numbered from 85 to 114 are shown in
Tab. 1. This dataset contains approximately 7 million votes in both the Senate and the House of Representatives from a total of
1498 and 1395 legislators from Democratic and Republican Parties, respectively. We adopt the well-known Rice index18 to
measure party dissimilarity in legislative voting. The Rice index is defined as the mean absolute distance between the Yes-ratios
of Democratic and Republican Parties on the bth bill
distb =
∣∣∣E{1≤i≤NRep}Repib−E{1≤ j≤NDem}Dem jb∣∣∣ (2)
where NRep and NDem denote the numbers of legislators from the Republican and Democratic Parties participating in the
vote, while Repib and Demo jb are the votes cast by Republican i and Democrat j for bill b, respectively. E represents the
corresponding average over all legislators in each party. The result of a vote is coded as 1 for Yes and 0 otherwise because the
bills pass by majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives and therefore abstaining is effectively equivalent to
opposing bill passage. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1A.
Regardless of the content of bills, we compute the average distance of bill votes between two parties over every 199 day
intervals. Formally, the polarization level at the tthh day of the kth Congress is quantified as
xk(t) =E{b:|tb−t|<100}distb (3)
where {b : |tb− t|< 100} is the set of bills voted within 199 days centered at the th day of the ith Congress and i starts at the
100th day of each Congress and ends 99 days before the last day of this Congress. Hence, each measurement includes exactly
200 days of voting. This step is illustrated by Fig. 1C. The averaging reduces the noise of the raw data because the topics of the
legislative bills may differ day-by-day in each Congress and there were several periods of times in the past six decades during
1The dataset is accessible at https://voteview.com/
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Figure 1. The illustration of the data collections and processing workflow. (A) For each bill voted in the Congress, we
measure the mean absolute distance, distb, between the votes of the Democratic and Republican Parties cast for the bill b; (B)
The distribution of the political polarization measured using the roll-call votes within each Congress. Labels at the right corner
of each sub-plot identify the first year of each Congress. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the polarization levels are generally smaller
than the levels in the 2000’s and 2010’s. After 2001, the two peaks of the voting results at the opposite ends of the political
spectrum start to emerge, indicating the growth of the number of bills on which two parties strongly disagree; (C) Regardless of
the content of bills, we compute the average distance of bill votes between two parties within each Congress in a sliding
window of 200 days (Eq. [3]); (D) The political polarization levels at ten evenly-distributed sampled time points exhibit an
evolution of polarization patterns from one type of behavior to another: the polarization level decreases in the 93rd Congress as
time from the replacement of members increases, while polarization remains at a relative stable level in the 96th Congress, and
grows in the Congresses with sessions numbered from 102 to 112.
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which very few bills were voted on by the U.S. Congresses. Compared to the approaches20, 22, 27 defining the conflicting level
between individuals, the well-know Rice index defined in Eq. [2], reflects the general trend of behavioral partisanship while
preserving its simplicity by quantifying polarization at party level. More importantly, the Rice index enables us to develop a
dynamical equation, Eq. [4], which captures the macroscopic behavior of the evolution of political polarization, regardless of
the complex interactions between individual legislators considered in20.
For every Congress and each bill, we measure the distance distb between two parties using Eq. [2]. As distb ∈ [0,1], the
political preference for bill b is defined as Db = 0.5− distb2 for the Democratic Party and Rb = 0.5+ distb2 for the Republican
Party. Then, using the kernel density estimation (KDE)21, we evaluate the distribution of distances Db and Rb, of Democratic
and Republican Parties, respectively, from the center of the polarization range. Fig. 1B shows the distribution of these distances
which represent positions of the two parties regarding the bills voted in each Congress.
Dynamical model of political polarization
We assume a two-party political system, such as exemplified by the United Kingdom, but applicable also to the U.S. and other
countries with a multi-party system dominated by two major parties. We also assume a social system in which polarization and
collaboration can convert into each other but preserve their sum at 1. A simple model of the dynamics of such conversion is
given in19 as
dx
dt
= yPyx(x,ux)− xPxy(x,ux) (4)
where Pyx(x,ux) is the probability of collaboration converting to polarization per unit of time. For symmetry, Pxy(x,ux) represents
the probability of polarization converting to collaboration per unit of time. Finally, x ∈ [0,1] is the current polarization level as
measured by the real legislative votes, ux is the polarization utility parameter, and y = 1− x and uy = 1−ux are complementary
to x and ux, representing the current collaboration level and the collaboration utility (ux+uy = 1). Following19, we assume that
Pyx has the following simple form
Pyx(x,ux) = cxaux (5)
which is supported by the normative social influence theory16 that postulates that the current polarization level x influences the
probability of conversion. To preserve symmetry under the conversion from y to x or vice versa, we define Pxy as
Pxy(x,ux) = Pyx(y,uy) = cyauy = c(1− x)a(1−ux) (6)
Similar nonlinear gain-loss equations for the state dynamics have been successfully applied to model various types of
polarization, ranging from religious affiliation19, to language choice24 and political affiliation26. The nonlinear dynamics
defined here captures the conversion between polarization and collaboration during different periods. The parameter ux is
independent of the polarization level x which varies as the time changes. It reflects internal hidden polarization level in the
legislative branch of government, which is not reflected from the vote results at that moment. The term xa captures the effect of
the current polarization level on the evolution. The speed of evolution is defined by the parameter c in our model.
The total energy25 in this dynamical system is governed by the following equation.
E(x, x˙) =
1
2
x˙2− cxy
( ux
x1−a
− uy
y1−a
)
(7)
which is constant on the solution curves or trajectories of this system, i.e. E(x, x˙) =C for some constant C. The total energy
function E(x, x˙) in relation to the current polarization x and its first order derivative x˙ is shown on the Fig. 2A for a < 1 and
Fig. 2B for a > 1.
Given the model parameters a and ux, the equilibrium points x∗ of the dynamical system defined by Eq. [4] can be derived
as
x∗(ux,a)≈ 1
1+ e2
1−2ux
1−a
(8)
The approximation uses the Taylor expansion of x˙ = 0. Its detailed derivation is presented in the supporting material. The
theoretical expression of equilibrium points closely matches the results found by numerical simulations.
The trajectories of the nonlinear dynamical evolution are shown in Fig. 2C-F where the x-axis represents time t and the
y-axis represents the polarization. Each trajectory curve starts from its initial polarization level x0 which is represented by
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Figure 2. The convergence of the political polarization model in relation to the polarization utility ux and initial state x0. The
time t is normalized in the plots to the range from 0 to 1. (A) The total energy of the dynamical system in relation to the
polarization x and its first order derivative x˙ for a < 1 (Eq. [7]); (B) The total energy of the dynamical system in relation to the
polarization x and its first order derivative x˙ for a > 1 (Eq. [7]); (C) For a < 1 the dynamical system always converges to certain
polarization level (a = 0.6); (D) For a > 1 the dynamical system either reaches complete consensus or complete polarization
depending on the initial state x0 (a = 2.5). (E) When a < 1, the equilibrium points of the dynamical system are stable as the
system gets trapped at these equilibrium points as the time approaches infinity; (F) When a > 1, the initial states (on the top of
the hills) are the tipping points causing the system to converge either to 0 (full polarization) or 1 (full consensus) from its initial
state x0.
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the z-axis. We show the surface of these convergence process for a < 1 and the initial polarization in full range from x0 = 0
to x0 = 1, in Fig. 2E. Fig. 2D contains similar visualization results with a > 1 and initial polarization levels x0 at the tipping
points, i.e. the points at the edges in dark blue of Fig. 2F. The equilibrium points of the dynamical model are stable when a < 1.
In such case, the dynamical system of Eq. [4] always converges to the x∗ ∈ [0,1] after the sufficient period of evolution; Fig. 2C
and 2E show example with a = 0.6. In contrast, when a > 1, the final state of the dynamical system depends on the initial
state and the position of the tipping point; Fig. 2D and 2F show example with a = 2.5. The dynamical system will eventually
converge to either x = 0 or x = 1.
In the context of political polarization, the case with a < 1 corresponds to a healthy political system which maintains the
polarization level within a certain range. However, the case with a > 1, corresponds to a system which switches easily between
fully polarized equilibrium point and complete consensus convergence point. In the U.S. political system, a change of the
system initial state happens periodically every two years as a result of election or reelection of the legislators. The system near
the tipping point at the end of one Congress is vulnerable to extreme state switching even under a small change of the initial
polarization for the next Congress.
We simulate the non-linear dynamics defined by Eq. [4] until the polarization level x converges. When a< 1, the equilibrium
point is exactly the final polarization level of convergence. When a > 1 the only equilibrium points are x = 1 that corresponds
to the full polarization, and x = 0 that represents the opposite case of full consensus. Moreover some of the initial states are
unstable; they are the tipping points from which the dynamical system nondeterministically converges to either of the two stable
equilibrium points. We grid-search for them with different values of ux. In each iteration, we increase the value of x by a small
∆x. If the final convergence states have changed from one state to another due to the increment of ∆x, then the current x is
identified as the tipping point.
Evolution of political polarization patterns
We fit the political polarization model defined by Eq. 4 to the data points xi(t) which represent ten evenly-distributed in time
sampled polarization levels at ti = ti,1, ti,2, . . . , ti,10 of the th Congress. The system is assumed to have the universal a and c
values at all times, but each Congress i has its own parameter ux defined as the polarization utility, and the particular initial
state, xi,0, which is defined by the member replacements caused by the most recent election.
The inference procedure estimates the values of universal parameters at a = 0.7, c = 0.37 while the set of values for ux, x0
is shown in Fig. 3B-C. In Fig. 3B, we illustrate the estimated value ui,x of the ith Congress. In general, this value increases as
the Congress session numbers grow from 85 to 114. The black solid curve in Fig. 3C shows the equilibrium points for different
ux values with global parameter a estimated from the voting data. To illustrate the impact of this parameter on values of the
equilibrium points, the dotted lines represent these values for a = 0.1, a = 0.37 and a = 0.95, respectively. This figure also
illustrates that most of the Congresses last too short to allow the equilibrium point to be reached before the election or reelection
of members defines new starting point of the system for the next Congress.
Since the estimate a = 0.7 is smaller than 1, the dynamical system has a unique equilibrium point for any given ux. As
shown in Fig. 3C, when the polarization level x is larger than the stable equilibrium point x∗, it decreases to approach this
point. This explains why the polarization level decreases in most of the Congresses in the 1970’s and 1980’s. After the
member replacement caused by the election, the initial polarization levels x0’s during this period were usually higher than the
corresponding stable equilibrium points of the dynamical system, see Fig. 3C. Therefore, the polarization level decreases within
the two-year term Congress. In contrast, when the equilibrium point x∗ is larger than the initial polarization x0, the polarization
x increases over time to approach the equilibrium point. This explains why the polarization level increases in most Congresses
after the 1980’s. Hence, the observed polarization patterns are fully recreated by the dynamics of our model.
It is worth noting that the initial polarization levels of the Congresses in the 1990’s are actually not significantly higher than
those observed in the previous Congresses. However, the polarization utility ux has become larger and in the later decades
exceeded 0.5 as Fig. 3B and Table 2 indicate. Consequently, the polarization levels at the end of Congresses have significantly
increased. This explains the rapid growth of polarization in the later Congresses. The sudden growth of polarization utility in
the 101st and 102nd Congresses (1989-1993), revealed by our model is in agreement with20 which describes a dramatic change
of polarization that started during the Clinton’s term (1993-1994), and solidified during the 104th Congress (1995-1996). Thus,
the growth of polarization utility came right before the growth of polarization because legislators need time to adjust voting
to the increased polarization which has been reflected by the polarization utility. As seen in Fig. 3D, the absolute change of
polarization |∆x| grows as the distance between the initial state x0 and equilibrium point x∗ increases. If the initial polarization
level of a Congress is far away from the its final point of convergence, then the rapid change of polarization would be expected
within the two-year term. The direction of such change in 28 out of all 30 Congresses are explained by the model, while the
two Congresses in disagreement with the model prediction have very small variations of polarization level as shown by the
yellow markers in Fig. 3C.
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Figure 3. The evolution of the political polarization in the U.S. Congress with subsequent sessions numbered from 85 to 114.
(A) Change of polarization within each U.S. Congress based on data and the optimal slope parameters estimated by the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression given the ten evenly-distributed in time points of polarization sampling for
each Congress. The polarization level is likely to decrease within each Congress after the member replacement in the 1970’s
and 1980’s, however, after the 101th Congress, which started in 1989, the polarization level is likely to increase instead; (B)
The estimated values of the polarization utility ux are generally increasing, while the periods of sharp growth are often
associated with the change of majorities in the Senate and the House of Representatives; (C) When the initial polarization level
(green cycles) is smaller than the stable polarization level predicted by our model (solid black curve), we observe an increase of
polarization within one Congress. The direction of such change in 28 out of all 30 Congresses are explained by the model
(green arrows), while the two Congresses in disagreement with prediction have minimal variations of the polarization level
(yellow arrow markers) which indicates weakly formed polarization direction; (D) When the initial polarization level x0 of a
Congress is farther away from the corresponding equilibrium point, the absolute change of polarization during the two-year
term, i.e. |∆x|, of this Congress is usually higher than of Congresses in which the initial polarization levels are closer to the
equilibrium points. The color of the scatter points indicates the sign of ∆x.
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Table 2. The estimated values of the polarization utility (P-utility) ux in each Congress. The 14 Congresses with the
presidential election held in the preceding year increase ux on average by 11.3% since the corresponding previous Congress
while the 15 Congresses with midterm elections (as the President passes half of his term at the time of the election), decreased
the polarization utility ux by -1.5% on average. Moreover, in the first three decades, the average polarization utility grew slowly
by 0.056, so 18.1% on average in Presidential election Congresses. All this growth was gained in four Presidential elections in
which the newly elected President and his predecessor belonged to different parties; each of these elections contributed growth
of 0.115. so 36.4%, on average. In contrast, the polarization utility decreased by -0.043 or -9.3% in midterm election
Congresses, raising only 14.3% over 30 years. In the latest three decades, the polarization utility grew in both types of
Congresses with similar average rates, of 0.023 or 4.6% for midterm election Congresses, and 0.21 or 7.3% for Presidential
election Congresses. From the 100th Congress to 114th Congress the polarization grew 77.5%, so five times higher than in the
earlier period. Finally 6 of 14 Presidential election Congresses started with polarization at least 50% while only one of 15
midterm election congresses achieved such high polarization
Midterm Election Congresses Presidential Election Congresses
Number P-utility Change Percentage Number P-utility Change Percentage
86th 0.3 -0.05 -14.3% 87th,∗ 0.54 0.24 80.0%
88th 0.4 -0.14 -25.9% 89th 0.37 -0.03 -7.5%
90th 0.32 -0.05 -13.5% 91st 0.43 0.11 34.4%
92nd 0.38 -0.05 -11.6% 93rd 0.31 -0.07 -18.4%
94th 0.33 0.02 6.5% 95th 0.4 0.07 21.2%
95th 0.4 0.00 0.00% 97th 0.44 0.04 10.0%
98th 0.43 -0.01 -2.3% 99th 0.46 0.03 7.0%
100th 0.4 -0.06 -13.0% 101st 0.47 0.07 17.5%
102nd 0.65 0.18 38.3% 103rd,∗ 0.61 -0.04 -6.2%
104th 0.54 -0.07 -11.5% 105th,∗ 0.61 0.07 13.0%
106th 0.5 -0.11 -18.0% 107th,∗ 0.5 0.00 0.0%
108th 0.52 0.02 4.0% 109th,∗ 0.57 0.05 9.6%
110th 0.48 -0.09 -15.8% 111th 0.42 -0.06 -12.5%
112th,∗ 0.66 0.24 57.1% 113th,∗ 0.73 0.07 10.6%
114th 0.71 -0.02 -2.74%
86th-100th 0.370 -0.043 -9.3% 0.421 0.056 18.1%
101st-114th 0.580 0.021 7.3% 0.559 0.023 4.6%
All 0.468 -0.013 -1.5% 0.481 0.039 11.3%
4 positive, 10 negative, 1 * 9 positive, 4 negative, 6 *
* denotes growth over
50%, marked also by bold font in the P-utility (polarization utility) column
Another sign of changed polarization patterns is the number of Congresses in which initial polarization utility is at least
50%, making it equal to or stronger than then the collaboration utility as defined in Eq. [1]. Only one Congress among 15 in the
first three decades reached this level, while it was achieved by 11 out of 14 Congresses in the last three decades.
In summary, our model explains the observed polarization patterns. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the initial polarization x0 is
generally larger than the stable polarization x∗, so we observe a decrease of polarization within each of two-year term Congress.
In other words, the legislators gradually agree more and more with the members of the opposite party than initially, while
they held more conflicting views at the very beginning of each Congress session. After the 101st Congress (1989-1991), the
initial polarization x0 is generally smaller than the stable polarization level x∗. Therefore, during the corresponding Congresses,
the polarization x increases to approach the corresponding equilibrium point defined by the given ux. This trend matches
the transition observed during the 103rd and 104th Congresses20, when the moderate members of each party joined their
majority-party coalitions, leaving the middle ground deserted.
Discussion
The dynamical model sheds some light on the causes of increased polarization in recent decades. As seen in Fig 3C, when ux is
small, the resulting stable polarization level decreases as the value of a increases, in response to the decreased probability of
conversion from collaboration to polarization (cf.Eq. [4]). In this case, the dynamical system is less sensitive to the current
polarization level x because the term xa in Eq. [4] becomes smaller as a grows. Therefore, when ux is small, a large value of
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a decreases the polarization level. However, when the value of a exceeds 1, some initial states become tipping points, from
which the system evolves undeterministically towards one of the two possible extreme equilibrium points, one of which, x = 1,
corresponds to the full polarization, while the other, x = 0, represents the full consensus. Below the tipping point, the system
converges to one of these two points, and above, it evolves towards the other. In the U.S. political system, a change of the initial
system state happens periodically every two years when the legislators are elected or reelected. The system in the neighborhood
of a tipping point is vulnerable to even small change in initial polarization that may switch the system convergemce point from
one extreme equilibrium point to another. Such abrupt and radical equilibrium point switching is absent when a is smaller than
1.
According to our model, we witness a growth of the polarization utility, ux, over the recent decades. The question arises
what are the causes of this increase. To answer this question, we start by observing that a politician needs to be elected to
become legislators and repeatadly reelected to continue in this role. Thus, the polarization utility for them lies in its ability to
bring votes. This can be accomplished either directly, by representing voters’ opinions, or by gaining resources for election
campaign funding. In the case of direct support, the polarization of voters has been rising in recent decades for such reasons
as the echo chambers effect8, 9 and the growth of new, often strongly biased social media13 or spread of misinformation10, 11.
Voters increasing polarization raises the polarization utility, which is indirectly reflected as the phenomenon that legislators
align their voting with positions of their electorates. The indirect support is gaining in importance because of escalating costs of
political campaigns fueled by the growing numbers of effective advertising channels and raising costs of advertising28.
To corroborate this conclusion, we identified two largest jumps in polarization utility resulting from election of Congress
members (see Table 2). The first jump of 0.24 happened in 1960 so it coincides with the start of civil right movement, increasing
the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, and generational changes in politics. In22, the author observe that such “takeoff
situations,” significantly increase polarization in the network structures of political connections. The second jump happened in
year 2010, when the Supreme Court approved Super PACs which are allowed to collect unlimited contributions from many
sources and to advocate for or against political candidates. Taming the causes of increased polarization is difficult. For example,
requireing biased social media to provide time to advovates of the opposing opinions was shown to be counter productive23.
The model introduced here implies that high polarization of voters makes the polarization utility higher to legislators,
resulting in higher polarization in the legislative chambers of government. The question arises under what conditions the
polarized politicians may in turn influence their electorates to become polarized even more. Finding these conditions is
important because should such feedback loop arise, it might destabilize democracy. In our future research, we will attempt
to address this question by developing a quantitative model of polarization dynamics of voters, to large extent shaped by the
economic factors29 and public opinions30.
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Supporting Material
Derivation of the equilibrium points
The equilibrium points x∗ of the dynamical model defined by Eq. [2.1] satisfy the following equation:
(1− x)xaux = x(1− x)a(1−ux). (9)
Setting w = x∗/(1− x∗) makes w depending only on the equilibrium point x∗, and yields the following:
a =
ln(1−u)− lnu
lnw
+1. (10)
Substituting u = (1+ z)/2, yields:
a =
ln(1− z)− ln(1+ z)
lnw
+1 (11)
which becomes a constant 1 when z approaches 0. Using the Taylor expansion of ln(1+ z) = ∑kj=1−(−z) j/ j−O(zk+1) and
ln(1− z) = ∑kj=1−z j/ j−O(zk+1), we get:
a =
−2z∑kj=0 z2 j/(2 j+1)+O(z2k+2)
lnw
+1 =
−2z∑kj=0 f (z,k)+O(z2k+2)
lnw
+1, (12)
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where f (z,k) = ∑kj=0
z2 j
2 j+1 . For z ∈ (−1,1) for simplicity we can use the approximation with k = 0:
a≈ 1−2z 1
lnw
(13)
Given the particular u and a and substituting w back with x∗/(1− x∗) and z with u, the equilibrium points x∗ of the dynamical
system have the analytic expression
x∗ ≈ 1
1+ exp
(
2 2u−1a−1
) (14)
To increase the precision of the approximation, we can use more terms in the Taylor expansion, for example
a≈ 1−2z f (z,k)
lnw
(15)
decreases the relative error of approximation to the upper bound defined now as z2k+2/(2k+3)/(1− z2). This approximation’s
relative error is small for quite large range, e.g., for z ∈ (−0.6,0.6) and therefore u ∈ (0.3,0.8), it is less than 0.3% for k = 2
for the broader range z ∈ (−0.8,0.8) so for u ∈ (0.1,0.9), the precision of less than 0.15% requires k = 5. Applying the same
transformation as before to Eq. [15], we get
x∗ ≈ 1
1+ exp
(
2 f (2u−1,k)a−1
) . (16)
When a < 1, these equilibrium points are stable19. However, when a > 1, there are some initial states that are tipping
points from which the system nondeterministically converges to one of the two extreme equilibrium points, either to full
consensus or to full polarization. In the context of political polarization, the existence of tipping points changes the stability
of the polarization evolution. When a > 1, and with the system in the neighborhood of a tipping point, in response to even a
small perturbation of the system state, the system may change the converges from one extreme equilibrium point to another.
When a < 1, the dynamical social system is more robust against the random perturbations because it always converges to the
equilibrium point with some level of polarization.
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